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Summary 
The problem of hypothesis testing is approached as an estimation problem 
rather than a 0-1 decision problem, using a loss function to evaluate estimation 
rules. The theory developed is quite general, and contains standard (Neyman-
Pearson) testing as a special case. Viewing hypothesis testing as estimation 
allows for formal evaluation of data-dependent frequentist measures of evidence. 
Particular attention is paid to the viability of the p-value as a measure of 
evidence, and some interesting conclusions, concerning admissibility in different 
testing problems, are reached. 
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1. Introduction 
Approaches to hypothesis testing have usually treated the problem of testing as one of 
decision-making rather than estimation. More precisely, a formal hypothesis test will result 
in a conclusion as to whether a hypothesis is true, and not provide a measure of evidence to 
associate with that conclusion. In this paper we consider hypothesis testing as an estimation 
problem within a decision-theoretic framework, and are able to arrive at some interesting 
conclusions. In particular, reasonable loss functions result in decision rules that can be 
regarded as measures of evidence and, under these loss functions, some interesting properties 
of p-values emerge. 
1.1 Standard Approaches 
Classical hypothesis testing is built around the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (Lehmann, 
1986) and results in decision rules that are 0-1 rules (except for randomized tests). These 
formal tests, although optimal in a strict frequentist sense, have been criticized from many 
different directions. Firstly, there have been many Bayesian criticisms (e.g., DeGroot, 1973; 
Dickey, 1977; Berger, 1985) which point out the drawbacks of the stringent conclusion of the 
Neyman-Pearson approach. Namely, the experimenter is locked into a two-point action 
space. Secondly, the assessment of accuracy of the test is typically a pre-data assessment, 
most often the size of the test. This estimate can be quite unreasonable when view post-
data, a criticism which has also been leveled at Neyman-Pearson theory by conditionalists 
(Kiefer, 1977; Robinson, 1979). Alternatives considered by Kiefer include using p-values as 
an assessment of the likelihood of the null hypothesis. These ideas are in the direction of 
those proposed here, that the hypothesis test should result in a post-data assessment of 
evidence. (In fairness to Neyman-Pearson theory, measures of size and power were proposed 
as pre-data operating characteristics, not post-data assessment of accuracy, of a testing 
procedure.) 
Perhaps the most serious criticism of Neyman-Pearson testing arises from the actions of 
practitioners. That is, formal Neyman-Pearson theory is not widely used in practice. Subject 
matter journals are flooded with p-values, but not with the outcomes of an a-level test. 
Furthermore, the p-value is implicitly used as a measure of evidence for a hypothesis. One of 
the reasons for undertaking the research presented here was to answer whether there are 
reasonable scenarios in testing for which the p-value is a reasonable answer. The fact that it 
is used extensively by experimenters is given; we, as statisticians, should decide whether the 
p-value has acceptable properties. 
'I 
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1.2 Criticisms of p-values 
Most criticisms leveled at p-values have come from the Bayesian school, although there 
have been others. Even though p-values can be similar to Bayesian posterior probabilities, 
there are many seeming defects to criticize. Since the p-value is, in many cases, of the form 
p(x) = P( T(X) > T(x) ), where T(x) is the observed value of the random variable T(X), 
there is the problem of averaging over unlikely sample values (which have not occurred). 
Moreover, this is in violation of the likelihood principle (Berger and Wolpert, 1984), which 
states that inference must be based only on the observed data. 
Even though p-values can fall within the range of Bayes solutions (Casella and Berger, 
1987), they are fundamentally different. This, in itself, is not a cause for concern, as good 
frequentist and Bayesian procedures may be different, but there have been many criticisms 
involving paradoxes (e.g., Lindley, 1957; Berger and Sellke, 1987; Berger and Delampady, 
1988). These paradoxes are all based on the fact that, at the tails, the p-value may be much 
smaller than Bayesian posterior probabilities in the two-sided testing problem. In the one-
sided problem, however, this paradox does not appear (Casella and Berger, 1987), as the p-
value is a limit of Bayes rules (see also Schaarfsma, et al., 1989). This observation may seem 
to be at odds with the previous paragraph, where we noted that the p-value violates the 
likelihood principle, something not done by a Bayes rule. The agreement of p-values and 
Bayesian posterior probabilities, however, is a mathematical identity specifying the agreement 
of two different integrals. Foundationally, the calculations are different. 
The different behavior of the p-value in the one-sided and two-sided problem is one 
reason for the present investigation. This different behavior suggests that the formulation of 
the problems themselves may be to blame. For example, difficulties arise in the Bayesian 
formulation of the two-sided point null testing problem, or the classical two-sided composite 
null problem. A decision-theoretic formulation of testing may answer our concerns in these 
cases, and possibly clear doubts about p-values. 
Other than Bayesian criticisms, problems with p-values can arise within classical 
statistics. (A strict Neyman-Pearson frequentist despises p-values with even more fervor 
than a Bayesian, as p-values have no real roots in frequentist theory. However, through their 
widespread use they are closely associated with classical, rather than Bayesian, statistics. It 
is thus the job of the frequentist to deal conclusively with p-values.) In some cases, p-values 
may be difficult to define (see the binomial example in Berger and Delampady, 1988, p.324), 
but if the p-value is defined in a straightforward way, it is usually from some Neyman-
Pearson optimal test. The problem here is that many users implicitly and wrongly assume 
that any optimality derived from the Neyman-Pearson Lemma can be transferred to data-
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dependent measures of accuracy. Although there has been some investigations about the 
behavior of p-values using loss functions (Gutmann, 1984; Schaarfsma, et al., 1989; 
Thompson, 1989), there has not been any systematic evaluation of post-data frequentist 
measures. There is a need for such an evaluation, and decision theory provides a natural 
mechanism for this task. 
1.3 A Decision-Theoretic Approach 
In a hypothesis testing problem we observe a value x of a random vector X with density 
(for convenience) f(xiB), and desire a conclusion about the hypotheses 
(1.1) versus 
where E>0 is a specified subset of the parameter space e. (We will not directly deal with the 
case of H 1 of the form H 1: 8 t: E>u where 6 1 =I 6 0, although many results can be extended to 
this case.) We view our task as that of estimating the viability of the set specified by H0 , 
that is, of estimating the function 100(0) (where lA(·) denotes the indicator of a set A). The 
performance of a decision rule, ¢(x), is evaluated with respect to a loss function 
(1.2) 
where the function d(t) is minimum at t = 0, nondecreasing for t > 0, and nonincreasing for 
t < o. 
An important point to note is that we are considering this problem as one of estimation, 
not of deciding between H0 and H1• Thus, we are making an assessment of H0 , rather than 
drawing a conclusion about H0 • To assess H0, we try to estimate 100(8) with ¢(x), where we 
consider the parameter 100(0) to measure the accuracy of the test (hence the title of the 
paper). The rule ¢(x) has the interpretation that large values support H 0 and small values 
support H1, much like a p-value or a posterior probability of H0 , and thus ¢(x) can be used 
by an experimenter in a similar way. Note however, that ¢(x) does not measure "evidence" 
in a formal sense, as that can only be done through the likelihood ratio (Birnbaum, 1962; 
Royall, 1986). Thus, we make the important distinction of referring to t/J(x) as a measure of 
accuracy, not evidence. 
Although (1.1) and (1.2) define the general problem of estimation in testing hypotheses, 
we will only consider some special cases in what follows, using losses of the form 
(1.3) k = 1 ,2, 
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with associated risk functions 
(1.4) k=1,2. 
Note that standard Neyman-Pearson type results may be viewed as decision-theoretic results 
using a loss of the form (1.3) with k = 1. In particular, the Bayes rules with respect to (1.3), 
with k=1, are Neyman-Pearson-type solutions. (Be mindful that our estimators tfo(x) 
estimate le0 (0), and are not a rejection probability. Thus, a Neyman-Pearson critical 
function would be equivalent to 1-tfo(x).) 
Although there is a technical connection between the decision-theoretic approach with 
absolute error loss and Neyman-Pearson theory, the answers are not the same. In Neyman-
Pearson theory the goal is to maximize power for a fixed a-level, while here the goal is to 
estimate le0 ( 0) using the loss (1.3), with no concern for a pre-experimental a-level. An 
example of the difference is the Neyman-Pearson need to consider randomized tests in 
discrete distributions. The estimator tfo(x) is only equivalent to a randomized test if k = 1 in 
(1.3). Furthermore, there is no correspondence between decision-theoretic testing/estimation 
and confidence set estimation unless an artificial a-level is reintroduced. (This is as it should 
be, as the two problems address different questions.) 
In hypothesis testing we are assessing tfo(x) as an estimator of le0 (0), while in set 
estimation we are concerned with the coverage of a set C(x). This can be expressed as 
assessing an estimator r(x) of IC(x)(O). Decision theoretic approaches to set estimation are 
the major concern of Casella, Hwang, and Robert (1989,1990), and Bayesian solutions are 
treated by Berger (1985a,b; 1986). Other papers dealing with estimation of accuracy in set 
estimation include Robinson (1979a,b), Brown and Hwang (1989), Hwang and Brown (1989), 
George and Casella (1989), Lu and Berger (1989), and Robert and Casella (1990). 
1.4 Summary of Results 
The two hypothesis testing problems we will be concerned with are the one-sided testing 
problem 
(1.5) versus 
where 00 is specified, and the two-sided testing problem 
(1.6) versus 
where 00 and 01 are specified. In either case we observe X = x, where X is a random vector 
with density f(xiO), and we base our inference on the statistic T(X) with density fT(t I 0). 
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In some cases, particularly in the two-sided testing problem, there are difficulties in 
defining a p-value. To eliminate these difficulties, we follow Lehmann (1986) and define it as 
follows. If Ra is the rejection region of an a-level test (most often UMPU) on which the p-
value, p(x), is to be based, we define 
(1.7) p(x) = inf{a: x £ Ra}, 
which eliminates ambiguities (as long as Ra is specified for each a). This also implicitly 
defines the p-value in terms of the random variable T(X). 
In Section 2 we examine the loss functions of (1.3) in more detail. We argue that 
absolute error loss (on which Neyman-Pearson testing is based) may not be the most 
reasonable loss function, and show that squared error loss emerges as an attractive 
alternative. Throughout the remainder of the paper we concentrate on squared error loss. In 
Section 3 we develop the decision theory using squared error loss. We provide an example 
then investigate minimaxity and admissibility, and are able to characterize the admissible 
rules in both one-sided and two-sided testing. Application of these results is in Section 4, 
which also contains a rather startling set of conclusions about p-values. Under certain 
assumptions, the p-value is admissible in the one-sided problem and inadmissible in the two-
sided problem. However, it cannot be uniformly dominated by a proper Bayes rule in the 
two-sided problem. Section 5 contains a discussion, and there is an Appendix containing the 
proofs of the theorems in Section 3. 
2. Consideration of Loss Functions 
For the hypothesis testing problem (1.1), we now investigate reasonable forms for a loss 
function L(O,¢), to assess the worth of the estimator -y(x) of 160(0). Since our parameter of 
interest has only two values, the loss function is of the form 
(2.1) L(O,¢(x)) = {L(1,¢(x)) 
L(O,¢(x)) 
if 0 E e0 
A minimal property for a loss function to have is that it be proper (Lindley, 1985). A 
proper loss function is one for which a Bayesian's best strategy is to tell the truth. (Whether 
one is a Bayesian, such a property is reasonable.) Thus, consider a prior distribution of 1r(O) 
on e. The posterior expected loss, of the loss function (2.1), given X=x, is 
(2.2) E(L(O,¢(x))IX=x) = J L(O,¢(x)) 1r(Oix)dO. 
e 
= L(1,¢(x)) P(OE60 Ix) + L(O,¢(x)) P(OE60 clx), 
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where 1r(Oix) = f(xl0)7r(O)/Je f(xl0)7r(O)d0 is the posterior distribution, and 
(2.3) P(OEe0 lx) = J 7r(Oix)d0. 
eo 
To say that the Bayesian's best strategy is to tell the truth is to say that the best estimator 
of Ie/0) is the Bayesian's best assessment of the probability of its occurrence. Thus, 
L(O,¢(x)) is proper if 
(2.4) min E(L(O,¢(x))IX=x) = E(L(8,P(OEe0 lx))IX=x). 
<P(x) 
Many common loss functions are proper, perhaps the most notable being squared error 
loss, corresponding to k=2 in (1.3), that is 
(2.5) 
Another, less common, proper loss is logarithmic loss, given by 
(2.6) 
This loss also has the interesting property of yielding an infinite penalty if ¢(x) is as wrong as 
possible. Surprisingly, absolute error loss, corresponding to k=1 in (1.3), or 
(2.7) 
is not a proper loss. Thus, if consideration is restricted to proper losses, absolute error loss, 
which corresponds to classical Neyman-Pearson theory, would be eliminated. 
The loss L 1 thus suffers from a foundational view, but its shortcomings have been known 
(perhaps informally) to many. For example, there is risk equivalence between (dreaded) 
randomized tests and estimators of Ie0 ( 0). This fact partially explains why L1 leads to 0-1 
Bayes solutions. This equivalence is easy to see if we write the risk of the decision rule ¢(x) 
as 
00 00 00 
R(O,¢) = J lle0(0)- ¢(x)lf(xiO)dx = •eg(O) J ¢(x)f(xl8)dx +.le0(0) J ( 1-<P(x) )f(xiO)dx 
-oo -oo -oo 
which is the risk of the randomized test ¢(x) (or, in Neyman-Pearson terms, the risk of the 
critical function 1-¢(X) under 0-1 loss). It is also possible, under suitable regularity 
conditions, to establish a converse. That is, the loss L1 is the only loss under which there is a 
direct correspondence between estimators of Ie0 ( 0) and randomized tests. 
The fact that the loss L1 is so closely related to Neyman-Pearson 0-1 loss leads to 
estimators that will not be smooth and, as such, may have problems (especially conditional 
ones). For example, suppose we have one observation from a n(0,1) density. A Bayes rule is 
¢71" (x) = I[O,c](lxl), which corresponds to the Neyman- Pearson UMPU test. The problem 
with this rule is that the same inference is made whether x = 0 or lxl = c. 
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If we turn to a straightforward decision-theoretic evaluation, similar answers would be 
found. Consider the following theorem, which is easy to establish. 
Theorem 2.1: a. The decision-theoretic Bayes rule with respect to the loss L 1 minimizes 
E11"(L1(9,¢)lx), and is given by 
(2.8) 11" {0 4>dx) = 1 if P(OE00 lx) < ~ 
otherwise 
b. The decision-theoretic Bayes rule with respect to the loss L 2 minimizes E11"(L2(9,¢)lx), 
and is given by 
(2.9) 4>-:(x) = P(O f 0 0 lx). 
We therefore see that the absolute error loss, Lh leads to a 0-1 Bayes solution, and can 
yield the usual Neyman-Pearson test in some cases (using point-mass priors). For the 
smoother loss L2 we get a smoother Bayes rule, which is, of course, the Bayesian estimate of 
the indicator function Ie0 ( 9). As we shall see, in some cases the p-value is a limit of rules of 
the form (2.9), an impossibility in other cases. 
The decision-theoretic derivation leads to the same place that the proper loss argument 
led. If we consider choosing between L1 and L2, the fact that for this loss function the Bayes 
rules are posterior probabilities is overwhelming. Since our goal is to estimate a probability, 
it is reassuring that the class of Bayes rules are exactly what we want. This observation is 
also of interest to non-Bayesians, since the class of Bayes rules is a subset of all admissible 
rules. Thus the loss L2 not only provides a smooth alternative to L1, it provides an 
alternative that produces sensible rules. 
Whether we argue based on decision theory or proper loss functions, L2 emerges as an 
extremely reasonable alternative to L1• Since classical testing theory is equivalent to decision 
theory based on L1, examination of decision theory based on L2 is in order. 
Of course, most of our arguments for preferring L2 loss over L1 loss could just as well 
support the use of any proper loss over L1• {Any proper loss will result in the Bayes 
estimator of Ie0(9) being P(O e 9 0 lx).) Seen in this light, it might be argued that we should 
investigate the decision theory of other proper losses. 
There are a number of reasons for not doing this. Firstly, the fact that all proper losses 
lead to the same Bayes estimator will result in similar decision-theoretic answers. Secondly, 
Hwang and Pemantle (1990) have found that L2 plays a special role among proper losses. In 
investigating admissibility for a class of proper losses, they found that admissibility with 
respect to L2 implied admissibility in the entire class. 
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Thirdly, there is a correspondence between admissibility with respect to L2 and the 
nonexistence of relevant betting procedures, as described by Robinson (1979a). This means 
that admissibility with respect to L2 will guarantee acceptable conditional performance. 
Combining all of the arguments in this section, we arrive at two conclusions. First, the 
loss L1 has inherent problems, and thus alternative losses should be considered. Second, 
among reasonable alternative losses, L2 emerges as an eminent choice. Thus, for the 
remainder of this paper, we concentrate on decision-theoretic hypothesis testing using L2 loss. 
3. Decision Theoretic Results. 
Under the loss L2 , we now examine some decision-theoretic consequences. To get a 
better idea of the situation, we first look at an example showing the behavior of some 
common rules. We then examine the criterion of minimaxity which, surprisingly, turns out to 
be a dead end. Then, admissibility is considered, and we are able to describe complete classes 
for both the one-sided and two-sided testing problem. 
3.1 An Example. 
To illustrate the risk behavior of some typical rules, we consider the simple situation of 
testing H0 : 0~0 versus H1: 0>0, based on one observation, x, from a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance 1. Two obvious estimators of 1(8~0) are the p-value, P(Z>x), 
where Z is a standard normal random variable, and the Neyman-Pearson rule ¢c(x)=I(x<c), 
where c is a constant chosen according to the size of the test. 
The risk of these rules is shown in Figure 1 along with the risk of two proper Bayes 
rules, using a n(O,r2 ) prior, and the minimax rule ¢0=~· The Bayes rules dominate the p-
value for 0 near zero, since the Bayes estimator, ¢r(x), is 
2 1 
¢r(x) = P( Z>CJ+1) 2x) > P(Z>x) = p-value. 
However, as (} moves away from zero, the p-value becomes dominant. (For T bigger than 1, 
the risk of the Bayes rule is extremely close to that of the p-value.) The risk of the Neyman-
Pearson rules, however, is quite high, and is dominated by the p-value. (A more complete 
comparison of p-values versus Neyman-Pearson rules is given in Casella and Wells, 1990.) 
Finally, the risk of the constant risk minimax estimator ¢0=~ is shown. We see that this rule 
is easily dominated for moderate values of 0, but performs well for 0 near H0 • The next 
section shows that ¢ 0 is admissible. 
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3.2 ~inim~ty 
Deriving a minimax rule is similar under either L2 or L1 loss, so we state the result m 
one theorem. 
Theorem 3.1: For the hypothesis testing problem of (1.1) with density f( xl ()) continuous in 
(),and loss Lk(B,</J) of(1.3), suppose that e0 and e1 have a common limit point. IfO $ </J $ 
1 is any decision rule, then 
m3x E()Lk(B,</J) 2 m3x E()Lk(B,</J 0 ) , 
where <!J0 (x) = ~· If k>1 then <Po is unique minimax, hence admissible. 
Proof. The proof uses standard applications of the Bounded Convergence Theorem and 
Liaponov's inequality, and is valid for all k ?: 1. The uniqueness of ¢>0 follows from the strict 
convexity of the loss if k> 1. 
It is interesting to note that the p-value is a minimax rule under L1• Thus, although 
minimaxity does not prove an interesting property for L2 , it does provide an optimality 
property for the p-value under L1. 
3.3 Complete Class Theorems Under L2 Loss. 
We next characterize complete classes of decision rules for both the one-sided (1.5) and 
two-sided (1.6) testing problem. The proofs of the main theorems become quite technical, 
and are placed in an appendix. 
For the complete class theorems we only consider the exponential family. We observe 
X=x, where X has a density in the one-parameter exponential family. Since estimators which 
are functions of the sufficient statistic T(x) are complete class, we confine attention to 
density functions defined on R, the range of T, 
(3.1) f(tiB) = eBt-'iJ!(B)' BE interior of e, 
where log 'iJ!(B) = JRe(Jtf(tiB)dJl(t). Because the results are valid in discrete as well as 
continuous problems, the integrating measure has been left vague. 
The rules in the complete class are essentially generalized estimators, after modification 
of the parameter space (see the Appendix) and allowance for truncation, which we now 
define. In the one-sided problem (1.5) an interval [t1 , t 2] is a truncation set for the estimator 
if> if t < t 1 implies if>(t) = 1 and t > t 2 implies </J(t) = 0. In the two-sided problem (1.6) an 
interval (t 1, t 2] is a truncation set for the estimator <P if t E [tl> t 2f implies <fJ(t) = 0. (The 
idea of a truncation set originated in Farrell (1968).) 
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Theorem 3.2: In the two-sided problem {1.6) the estimator ¢ with truncation set [t1 , t2] is 
admissible if there exists a probability measure 1r0 supported on [0 0 , 01] and a u-finite 
measure 1r1 supported on { -oo, 00 ] U (01, oo) such that, for almost all t1 < t < t 2 
' 
(3.2) 
and 
{3.3) 
f.Jtti 8)1r1(d8) < oo 
fi(ti0)?r 0(d0) 
¢(t) = Ji(ti0)?r0 (d0) + fi(ti0)?r 1(d0). 
Conversely, if¢ is admissible then there exist a truncation set [t1 , t2], a probability measure 
1r0 supported on [00 , 01] and a u-finite measure 1r1 supported on { -oo, 00 ] U (01, oo) such that 
(3.2) and (3.3) hold for t E ( t1 , t2). 
Theorem 3.3: In the one-sided problem (1.5), let ¢ be an admissible estimator under L2-loss. 
Then there is a nonincreasing function ¢' equivalent to ¢. Assume without loss of generality 
that ¢ is nonincreasing and that e = [ tf, t~] is a truncation set for ¢ such that if tf < t < t~ 
then 0 < ¢(t) < 1. Let tf < t0 < t~. There exist u-finite measures 1r 0 on (-oo, 00 ] and 1r 1 
on [0 0 , oo) such that 
(3.4) 
and ¢ is given by (3.3) for t E ( t1 , t2 ), both integrals of (3.3) being finite. 
As mentioned before, the essential point of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 is that the complete 
class is given by the generalized Bayes rules (almost). Thus, to establish admissibility, one 
would first check to see if a rule is generalized Bayes. In the next section we apply this 
strategy to the p-value. 
4. Admissibility Considerations Under L2 Loss 
We now return to exploration of the behavior of the p-value, and find that under L2 loss 
the results are quite interesting. There is a dichotomy occurring in the fate of the p-value, 
one that, perhaps, is reflected in the dissenting views of Berger and Sellke (1987) and Casella 
and Berger (1987a). In the one-sided testing problem the p-value is, in many cases, 
admissible against the loss L2 of (2.5), showing that the p-value is a reasonable measure of 
accuracy, a notion that agrees with Casella and Berger {1987a). 
In the two-sided case, however, the answers are a bit more involved, in that the p-value 
is inadmissible but difficult to dominate. We are able to show that the usual p-value is not in 
the complete class of Theorem 3.2 (the two-sided problem), demonstrating its 
inadmissibility. This fact is consonant with the results of Berger and Sellke (1987) and 
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Berger and Delampady (1987) concerning the failings of the p-value in the two-sided problem. 
However, there is an interesting occurrence in the two-sided point null normal case: 
Although the p-value is inadmissible, it cannot be dominated by any proper Bayes estimator. 
4.1.1 Examples of Admissibility in the One-Sided Problem 
We present a number of examples in which the p-value is generalized Bayes, hence 
admissible. This property probably carries over to other distributions, but in the following 
cases the admissibility of the p-value can be easily established. 
Theorem 4.1: For the one-sided hypothesis testing problem of (1.5), with loss function L2 of 
(2.5), let X 1,-··,Xn be iid n(B,1). The p-value p(x) = Po/X > x) = 1 - ~( {n(x - 00 ) ), zs 
admissible, where X is the mean of X 1,. · · ,Xn with observed value x. 
Proof: Using sufficiency, we can assume n = 1. Note that the p-value is generalized Bayes 
with respect to the Lebesgue measure prior (it is also a limit of Bayes rules against the 
sequence of n(00 ,r) priors). Furthermore, the (generalized) Bayes risk of the p-value is finite. 
Therefore the p-value is admissible. 0 
We now establish the admissibility of the p-value for some discrete distributions using a 
similar method. We summarize these results in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.2: For the one-sided hypothesis testing problem of (1.5), with loss function L2 of 
(2.5) 
a. If J(xiO) is binomial (n,B), the p-value p(x) = Po (X ~ x) = £ (i:)B~(1-B0)n-x zs 
o k=x 
admissible. 
b. If J(xiB) is Poisson(B), the p-value p(x) =Po (X~ x) = ~ e-00 0~/k! is admissible. 
o k=x 
Proof: For (a), consider the generalized prior density 1/0, which has corresponding 
generalized Bayes estimator p(x). The fact that this estimator has finite generalized Bayes 
risk follows from the fact that the estimator 
{ 1 if x=O c5(x) = 
0 otherwise 
has finite generalized Bayes risk. Thus p(x) is admissible. Part (b) can be established 
similarly by again considering the generalized prior density 1/B. 0 
We also note that in both the binomial and Poisson cases, generalization to an iid 
sample is immediate. Therefore, in a number of cases in the one-sided testing problem, the p-
value is admissible as an estimator of I( -oo,Oo)(O). 
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4.1.2 Admissibility in the Two-Sided Problem 
The complete class theorem (Theorem 3.2) gives us a powerful tool for exploring 
admissibility of the p-value in the two-sided problem. The following theorem, which is a 
corollary of Theorem 3.2, allows us to reach some decisive conclusions about inadmissibility of 
the p-value. 
Theorem 4.3: For the hypothesis testing problem of (1.6), with loss function L2 of (2.5), 
suppose the estimator <p(T(x)) > 0 is continuous, nonconstant, and, for some value x0 , 
<p( T( x0 )) = 1. Then <p is inadmissible. 
Proof. If <p were admissible, then almost surely (3.3) holds. Since <p > 0 for all x, 
Jf( xI 0 )1r( dO) < oo for almost all x. Thus, both sides of (3.3) are continuous in x, and hence 
equal for all x in the support of X. Since f( x 18) > 0, and 1r ;;::: 1r0 , <p(T(x0 )) = 1 implies 1r = 
1r 0 and <p(T(x)) = 1 for all x, a contradiction. 0 
The result of Theorem 4.3 now allows us to answer the question of the admissibility of 
the p-value. 
Theorem 4.4: For the hypothesis testing problem of (1.6), with loss function L 2 of (2.5) and 
T(x) continuous, the p-value is inadmissible. 
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that the p-value given in (1.7) takes the value 1. For 
the hypotheses of (1.6), the p-value is based on a UMPU test of the form 
(4.1) 
0 
<l(x) = t if T(x) < c0 or T(x) > c1 
if c0 ~ T(x) ~ c1 
where ¢(x) is the probability of accepting H0. The constants c0 and c1 are functions of a, the 
level of the test, that is, c0 = c0( a) and c1 = c1 (a). 
We first deal with the case 80 # 81• By Lehmann(1986, page 135), c0(a) and c1(a) 
satisfy 
(4.2) P 0/c0(a) ~ T(X) ~ c1(a)) = P 01(c0(a) ~ T(X) ~ c1(a)) = 1-a. 
Define 
c* = inf{ T(x): f( x 181 ) ;;::: f( xI 00 ) and x in the support of X}· 
By the continuity if T(x), c*is in the support of T(x). Also define 
' W'(81)- W'(8o) 
c = 8 8 , 
1 - 0 
for W'(·) as in (3.1). Note that f(xl8 1 );;::: f(xl8 0 ) if and only if T(x);;::: c1, from which it 
-14-
follows that c* ;;:: c1• 
We claim that for every a, 0 < a < 1, c*E [c0(a) ,c(a)]. This then implies that 
p(T(x)) = 1 when T(x) = c*, and thus, by Theorem 4.3, the p-value is inadmissible. To 
establish the claim, suppose to the contrary that c*~ [c0(a) ,c(a)] for some a > 0, say c* < 
c0(a). Thus, for T(x)E [c0(a),c(a)], f(xiOd;;:: f(xl00). From (4.2) it follows that 
1(c0(a)::::; T(X)::::; c1(a))(f(xl0d- f(xl00)) = 0 a.s., 
which implies that whenever c0(a)::::; T(X) ::::; c1(a), T(x) = c1• However, c1 ::::; c* < c0(a), so 
P 00(c0(a)::::; T(X)::::; c1(a)) = 0 implying a= 0 which is a contradiction. Thus the claim is 
established and the p-value is inadmissible if 00 =I 01• 
and 
If 00 = 01, instead off( xI 00 ) and f( xI Od, we consider 
f( x 1 o*) = ( E00 T(X) )fC x 1 00 ) 
f( X I o**) = T(X)f( X I Oo ). 
Arguments similar to those above, along with (5) and (6) of Lehmann(1986, page 136), can 
be used to establish the inadmissibility of the p-value in this case. 0 
Remark: For the case of testing a point null hypothesis, where 00 = 01 and c0 = -c1, 
Theorem 4.4 immediately applies. In fact, it can be made to apply to a k-parameter 
exponential family. 
Although Theorem 4.4 is negative in its assessment of p-values, we will see that it is, 
perhaps, not as negative as it might first appear. We now look at the special case of testing 
a point null hypothesis about a normal mean, and find that the p-value cannot be dominated 
by any proper Bayes procedure. Thus, even though the p-value is inadmissible for testing a 
point null hypothesis, it is quite difficult to exhibit a better estimator. As before, sufficiency 
allows us to consider the case of one observation. 
Theorem 4.5: For testing the hypothesis 
Ho: (} = Oo vs. 
based on one observation X from a n(O,l) density, and using loss function L2 of (2.5), the p-
value cannot be dominated by any Bayes rule. 
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that 00 = 0. The Bayes rules for this problem are 
of the form 
1r ( ) 1r 0f(xl0) 
<P x = 1r0f(xiO) + (1-7r0) I f(xiO)g(O)J.L(dO) ' 
00 
where f(xiO) is a n(O,l) density and I g(O)J.L(dO) = 1 (see Section 2), and the p-value is given 
-oo 
by 
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(4.3) p(x) = P(IXI ~ x) = 2( 1 - <P(x)) . 
We consider three cases. 
Case 1: 1r0 =1. In this case ¢1r (x) = 1. As 0-+oo, R( 0, p(x)) -+ 0 but R( 0,¢1r (x)) = 1 for 
0 =/= 0, so ¢1r (x) cannot dominate p(x). 
Case 2:1r0=0. In this case ¢1r(x) = 0 so R(o,¢1r) = 1 > R(O,p(x)) =~and ¢1r(x) cannot 
dominate p(x). 
Case 3: 0 < 1r0 < 1. We will show that as 0-+oo, R(O ,p(x)) becomes smaller than R(0,¢1r). 
First note that for sufficiently large lxl > a > 0, ¢1r (x) > p(x). This follows from the fact 
that 
(4.4) 
for sufficiently large lxl, where 0 =xis the maximum likelihood estimator of 0. 
For 0 :f:. 00 , the difference in risks is given by 
(4.5) Eo( I{Oo}(O)- ¢1r(X) ) 2 -Eo( I{Oo}(O)- p(X) ) 2 =Eo( ¢""(X) 2 - p(X)2), 
and from (4.4), by continuity, there exists an t > 0 such that ¢""(x)2 - p(x) 2 > t for all 
a < lxl < a+t. Hence 
(4.6) 
This lower bound is positive for large 0 since 
P 0(a < lXI < a+t) 
Po(IXI <a) -+ oo as 
by L'Hospital's rule. Therefore the difference in risks is strictly positive for large 0, and 
¢1r(x) cannot dominate p(x). D 
Thus, we are left with an interesting situation. We have an inadmissible rule, p(x), that 
cannot be dominated by any obvious competitor based on a Bayes argument. Using a 
generalized Bayes estimator based on a complicated prior, Hwang and Pemantle (1990) 
constructed an estimator that dominates the p-value. That estimator was only constructed 
for that purpose, however, and will probably not gain widespread use in practice. Thus, the 
p-value will, no doubt, remain as an often used estimator of accuracy, and although 
inadmissible in the two-sided problem, may not be too bad. 
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5. Discussion 
The formulation of hypothesis testing as a decision-theoretic estimation problem leads to 
results, that is, estimators, that are more satisfying than the conclusions from Neyman-
Pearson theory. These estimators, which may be considered measures of evidence possess 
formal optimality properties. Viewing the testing problem as one of estimating an indicator 
of H0 , and separating it from the set estimation problem, leads to estimators that are more 
desirable in practice. 
The failure of minimaxity to provide any interesting results for the loss Lk of (1.3), with 
k > 1, is surprising, and we are unsure bow to interpret this. The fact that ¢0 = ~ is 
minimax was anticipated, but the fact that it is unique minimax was not. Therefore, we 
have to accept the fact that for strictly convex loss functions, if we use a data-dependent 
measure of evidence, we will sometimes do worse than the "no-data" rule ¢0 = ~- Minimaxity 
may prove to be a useful criterion, however, in any further decision-theoretic study using 
absolute error loss. 
The dichotomy between the (rather straightforward) one-sided problem and the (more 
involved) two-sided problem is illustrated by the fate of the p-value. It is generally 
admissible in the one-sided case (being a limit of Bayes rules) but inadmissible in the two-
sided case (not corresponding to any generalized Bayes rule). These conclusions are in line 
with, and partially explain, the opposing arguments of Berger and Sellke (1987) and Berger 
and Delampady (1988), who contended that the p-value is unreasonable in two-sided 
problems, and Casella and Berger (1987), who contended that the p-value can be reasonable 
in one-sided problems. 
What is even more startling, however, is the inability of any Bayes rule to dominate the 
p-value in the two-sided point null problem. Unless we can find a practical dominating 
estimator, this gives the p-value a position enjoyed by few estimators (the positive-part 
James-Stein estimator comes to mind), an inadmissible estimator for which it is difficult to 
exhibit a dominating estimator. Thus, even in the two-sided case, the p-value could be a 
viable measure of evidence against H0• 
These conclusions about the p-value are tied to the use of squared error loss, the loss 1 2 
of (2.5). This may be a cause for criticism, for we are somewhat unsure of what the 
conclusions will be if other losses are used. However, this is a loss that results in the Bayes 
rules being given by the posterior probabilities, a perfectly natural situation shared by other 
proper losses. This leads us to believe that, for any proper loss, the results presented here 
would continue to be valid. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 3.2 a.nd 3.3 
We first establish some preliminary notation and lemmas. 
Lemma A.l: For L2 loss, if¢/ is as good as tjJ and tjJ has truncation set [t1, t2] then tjJ(t) = 
t/J'(t), fort< t1 or t > t2• 
Proof: The standard argument for this result is to use Stein (1956). 0 
In order to prove the best possible result it is necessary to modify the parameter space. 
We discuss this for the two-sided problem. Let 
and 
Define 
R1(0,t/J) = Eo(B[Bo,B1](0)- tjJ(X) )2 ' 
R2 [(i,O),t/J] = E0(DI0(0,0) - tjJ(X) ) 2 , (i,O) E I0 , 
and 
Because R 2(-,tjJ) can be obtained as a limit of R1(-,t/J) the following lemma is easy to verify. 
Lemma A.2: tjJ is admissible for risk R1 if and only if tjJ is admissible for risk R 2• 
Remark: In the two-sided problem with modified parameter space, when 1r0 and 1r1 are finite 
measures, the Bayes estimators are given by equation (3.3). In particular, the constant 
valued estimators tjJ(t) = a are Bayes estimators in the modified problem, hence are 
admissible. 
In the following proofs we write (} rather than (i,O) and use (3.3). 
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Assume tjJ(X) is any admissible rule. From Brown (1986, Proposition 
4A.7 and Theorem 4A.12) there exists a. sequence of finite priors (JJ0., p1.) concentrated on JJ· ~ J 
finite subsets such that the Bayes estimators tjJ 1(t) converge to t/J(t) almost surely. The 
special case tjJ = 0 is obvious and we assume Eot/J[T(X)] > 0. By the dominated convergence 
theorem .lim E0/'i[T(X)] = E0t/J[T(X)] so that for all large j, t/JI'j(t) > 0 with positive 
J-+00 
measure. Hence p 0j([00 , 01]) > 0 and by renormalization we assume JJ0jC[B0 , 01]) = 1. 
The convex set 
(A.1) e' = {t: ti.m sup J etO-W"(O)p1-(dO) < oo} 
J--+00 J 
is an interval. Clearly from (3.3) for almost all t not in e, ¢(t) = 0. Let e = [t1 , t 2) be the 
closure of e' and use e as a truncation set. 
From (3.3), for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 , 
0 < .tim ¢Pi(t) = ¢(t) . 
J--+00 
If necessary by choice of subsequence we may assume ~-'oj converges to a probability measure 
Jlo weakly so that 
. tim Jf( tio)Jl0·( dO) = Jf( t10)p0 ( dO) . 
J--+00 ~ 
It then follows for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 that .tim Jf(ti0)1J1·(d0) exists and is finite. 
J--+00 J 
Thus, if t 1 < t 2 , then standard arguments may be used to show there exists a limiting u-
finite measure 1-'I (and a subsequence if necessary), such that p 1j --+ Ill and if t 1 < t < t 2 then 
(A.2) Jim J eOt-\l!(O) Jl··(dO) = J /t-lii(O) I'·( dO) , i = 1,2 . 
J --+00 lJ 1 
Thus for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 , ¢(t) can be expressed as in (3.3), establishing the second part 
of Theorem 3.2. The first part of Theorem 3.2 follows from Lemma A.2 and the uniqueness 
of the generalized Bayes estimator as minimizing the generalized Bayes risk. D 
Proof of Theorem 3.3: In the one-sided problem of (1.5), for density functions (3.1), by 
modification of the functions b and W, we can assume without loss that 00 = 0 since we can 
write 
Assume ¢( t) is admissible. Bayes rules are given for the modified parameter space by 
J0 f(t,0)1r0(dO) ¢1r(t) = -00 • J~00f( t,0)1r0 ( dO) + J~f( t,0)1r1 (dO) 
It follows at once that in the exponential case ¢7r(t) is nonincreasing. ¢ as an almost sure 
limit of Bayes estimators is thus equal almost surely to a nonincreasing function. Without 
loss of generality assume ¢ is nonincreasing. 
Let e = {t : 0 < ¢(t) < 1}. Then e is an interval. We assume e contains two 
distinct points, hence has nonvoid interior. Define 1'7r(t) by 
Thus ¢7r = 1/1+r1r(t). If t E e, then 0 < r7r(t) < oo. 
Let {1ron• 1r10} be a sequence of finite measures such that 1ron(-oo, oo)+1r10(-oo, oo) = 
1 with corresponding Bayes estimators t/11rn(x) --. ¢(x) almost surely. Define 'Y?rn as above, 
and let 
1rn(A) = 1ron(A) + 1rm(A) and 
where t 0 is in the interior of e by hypothesis. Renormalize so that .\n( -oo, oo) = 1. Then 
the sequence Pn} is tight. To show this, let f > 0 and an --. oo such that .\n[(an, oo)] ~ f. 
Take t E e, t > t 0 • Then 
Jo (t-t )o sup e 0 An(dO) :$ 1 
n -oo 
and 
Joo (t-t0)0 (t-t )an l!im sup e .\n(dO) ~ tl!im sup e 0 = +00. 
n-.oo 0 n-.oo 
Hence fim sup 'Y?rn(t) = +OO, which is a contradiction. 
n-.oo 
If an --. -oo and J.tn[( -oo, an)] ~ t, take t E e, t - t 0 < 0. Then 
fim sup J0 e(t-to)O.\n(dO) ~ eim sup fe(t-to)an = +00 
n-.oo _00 n-.oo 
and 
Joo (t t )0 sup e - 0 An(dO) $ 1 . 
n 0 
Thus fim inf -y'~~"n(t) = 0, which is again a contradiction. 
n-.oo 
t 00-'li(O) Define .\in(A) = J A e 1rin(dO). The sequences [Ain} are tight and Aon --. .\0, 
.\10 --. .\1 (if necessary by taking subsequences). Thus .\0 + .\1 is a probability measure. 
The assumption 0 < -y(t) < oo implies that if t E interior e, then (as shown above) 
J (t-t )0 sup e 0 .\. (dO) < oo, i = 0,1 . 
n ln 
It then follows that if t 1, t 2 E interior e and t 1 < t 2, then the sequences 
:\. (A) = J (e(tcto)O + e(t2-to)O)A· (dO) 
m A m 
are tight. This follows since, by the preceding argument, t 0 is an arbitrary interior point of 
e. 
Thus assume :\in --. :\i' i = 0, 1. If t 1 < t < t 2, and his a bounded continuous function, 
then 
For h with compact support it then follows that 
J (t-t0)0 J (t-to)O _ e h( O)~i (dO) = ( tcto)o ( t2-to)O h( O)Ai (dO) 
e +e 
0 
Remark. This argument is still correct for the discrete exponential families. Here the 
interesting points of the truncation set e are atoms of the integrating measure. For each 
atom t E e, 0 < eim ¢?rn(t) < 1 and the above argument goes through. 
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Figure 1: rusks for testing Ho: 0 ::5 0 versus Hl: 0 > 0, based on one observation X from a 
n(O, 1) distribution. The solid line is the risk of the p-value, P(Z>x), where Z is a standard 
. 2 ! 
normal random variable. Bayes risks are given for the estimator t/Jr(x) = P(z>(r:-+1) 2x) 
for two n(O, r 2) priors, r 2 = .01 (short dashes) and r 2 = .1 (close dots). The risk of the 
Neyman-Pearson rules are also give for a=.05 (long dashes) and a=.25 (dots). Finally, the 
constant risk=.25 is the risk of the minimax estimator 4>o=~· 
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